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I. INTRODUCTION
This article will deal with the 1975 proposal of the European
Communities Commission concerning a Statute for the European
Company.' This draft is an amended edition of a previous proposal
submitted by the Commission in 1970 to the Council of Ministers
of the European Communities.2 The 1970 proposal was based largely
on a so-called Preliminary Draft made at the request of the Com-
mission by the author of this article. This Preliminary Draft dates
from 1966.3 It would be rather confusing to go through all these
different stages and to discuss the evolution of the project in detail.
The readers of this Journal may be interested above all in the pres-
ent status of the project; i.e., the 1975 Draft Statute.
The idea of creating a European Company was ventured at my
inaugural lecture in 1959.1 In fact, being a practising lawyer until
that moment, I was confronted more than once with the question
from clients from outside the Common Market as to in which of the
Member States (then only six) they should form their subsidiary.
* Professor of Comparative Law at the Law Faculty of the Erasmus University, Rotterdam.
Mr. (Meester in de Rechten), 1933, Dr. (Doctor in de Rechtsgeleerdheid), 1945, University of
Leyden.
' 8 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Supp. No. 4 (1975) [hereinafter cited as 1975
Draft Statute].
I Proposition de rglement (CEE) du Conseil portant statut de la sociatk anonyme
europkenne, 13 E.E.C. J.O. C124 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Draft Statute]. The 1970
Draft Statute was issued, with explanatory notes, in 3 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES Supp. No. 8 (1970).
P. SANDERS, PROJECT D'UN STATUT DES SOCItrl5 ANONYMES EUROPfENNES (Etude Serie Con-
currence No. 6, 1967) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Preliminary Draft Statute]. Commerce
Clearing House, Inc. has published an English translation: P. SANDERS, EUROPEAN STOCK
CORPORATION (1969) (including the text with a commentary by the author).
I For translations of the lecture under the title Towards a European Company? see 6
AUSSENWIRTSCHAITSDIENST DES BETRIEBS-BERATERS 1 (1960) (in German); 3 LE DROrr EUROPIEN
9 (1960) (in French); 4 REVISTA DELLE SOCIETA 1163 (1959) (in Italian).
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Each of the Member States at the time had and until now still has,
in spite of some harmonization achieved in the meantime, its own
national company law. As a rule, however, an American or English
subsidiary (at that time the United Kingdom was not a member of
the European Communities) was meant to do business in all of the
member countries. Could this purpose best be served by forming a
company in France, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, or
Italy? Why should it not be possible to constitute a company that
as such would be recognized in all of the Member States and which
could do business in those countries on an equal footing with domes-
tic corporations: a company not subject to the national company
law of the country involved, but to a uniform European company
law, applicable directly in all the Member States alongside the
national company law?
While the idea seemed to have some attractions, its realization
was another matter. It was only in 1965, at the initiative of the
French Government, that the Commission of the European
Economic Community asked me to put this idea, with the assis-
tance of company law experts from other countries of the EEC, in
the form of a concrete draft. The result was the 1966 Preliminary
Draft Statute,5 which was published in 1967. In the first years there-
after-I make the story short-no progress was made. It was there-
fore that the Commission itself in 1970 made its first proposal of a
draft statute which was no longer under the responsibility of an
individual, but shared the authority of the Commission.' With this
1970 Draft Statute7 of the Commission the Sanders draft became
history!
The Commission's 1970 Draft Statute is in the form of a regula-
tion. This was, at the time, a daring step. Once approved by the
Council of Ministers this regulation will be in force directly in all
the Member States and thus will need no further implementation.
Therefore, this would also apply to the Statute of the European
Company, introducing a complete new form of company in the
Note 3 supra.
For a comparative study see J. MICALLEF, THE EUROPEAN COMPANY, A COMPARATIVE STUDY
WITH ENGLISCH AND MALTESE COMPANY LAW (1975). This study is based on the 1970 Draft
Statute, supra note 2. The study also compares the 1970 Draft Statute with the 1966 Prelimi-
nary Draft Statute, supra note 3, the so-called "Sanders Draft." The 765 page study also
contains an extensive bibliography.
Note 2 supra.
It may still be consulted, however, as it contains in its commentary many references to
comparative law. These references have not been repeated in the proposals of the Commis-
sion. The (much shorter) commentary of these drafts is of a different nature.
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Member States next to their existing company forms of national
law. The Rome Treaty9 does not contain a special provision for the
creation of this new instrument. It must be based on the general
provision of article 235 for filling gaps in the Treaty if this is deemed
necessary to achieve the aims of the Community. This, according
to the Commission, is indeed the case: in order to achieve a truly
common market, an appropriate form should be created for enter-
prises of different Member States to cooperate and to concentrate
their economic potential.
The same article (article 235) requires a unanimous vote of the
Council and previous consultation of the Assembly for the adoption
of such a regulation. Therefore, after the Commission had offered
its proposal to the Council on June 30, 1970, it went for consultation
to the European Parliament and, as understandable in a matter like
this, also to the Economic and Social Committee.'0 The Economic
and Social Committee gave their opinion in 1972." The consultation
of the Parliament was not concluded until 1974.11 Four years passed
during which, among others, the United Kingdom became a mem-
ber of the European Communities. Also during those 4 years, the
ideas on employee participation and the structure of the company
developed considerably. This evolution is reflected on the national
level,' 3 as well as in the amendments proposed by the European
Parliament during its debates on the Commission's proposal, which
I shall consider later.
Taking into account the consultations of the Economic and Social
Committee and the European Parliament-and also the reactions
and criticisms received from other sides-the Commission offered
the Council an amended proposal in May 1975. This proposal will
in all probability be dealt with in a final round by a working party
under auspices of the Council. This working party has still to be
I Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done March 25, 1957, in OFFICE
FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE Euino-
PEAN COMMUNITIES 163 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Rome Treaty]. Another English version,
although unofficial, may be found at 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
Pursuant to Rome Treaty, supra note 9, art. 198.
Consultation du Comitt economique et social sur une proposition de r~glement du Con-
seil portant 6tablissement d'un statut de soci~tt anonyme europtenne, 15 E.E.C. J.O. C131,
at 32 (1972).
12 Resolution embodying the opinion of the European Parliament on the proposal from the
Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a Regulation embodying a
Statute for the European Company, 17 E.E.C. J.O. C93, at 22 (1974).
11 For a summary of these developments on the national level see Employee Participation
and Company Structure, 8 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Supp. No. 8 (1975).
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formed. For the moment (February 1976) the Permanent Represent-
atives are studying the main political issues involved. Only when
the results of these studies are known will a working party be able
to start. It then may take another few years before this final round
is finished. Therefore, the European Company actually may not be
born before 1980.
This would mean a drafting period of 20 years from the inception
of the idea in 1959 to its realization; or about 14 years when we start
counting from the work on the 1966 Preliminary Draft Statute. If
really achieved in such a period, this would not be bad at all for such
an ambitious project as the creation of a complete new company
form, the creation of the Societas Europaea (S.E.) as it has been
called since the Preliminary Draft. Legislation takes time, even
when only one country is concerned. The European Company Stat-
ute, however, is a piece of legislation by now for nine countries.
The 1975 version of the Statute still contains 284 articles,'4 as in
the 1970 draft. Moreover, there are four annexes, two of which are
newly added.' 5 It is obvious that, in this contribution, it will not be
possible to go into all aspects of the Statute. I shall limit myself to
those which may give the readers of this Journal a general impres-
sion as to how the European Company is structured and what pur-
poses it is aimed to serve.
II. FIELD OF APPLICATION
The S.E. is intended to function as a company form in addition
to the company forms already existing in the Member States of the
European Communities. The Statute" for the S.E. therefore does
not replace any national company law. It only presents an extra
possibility, put at the disposal of the business community for coop-
eration across borders between companies of different national law.
No one is obliged to use this new instrument. It is up to the business
community to decide whether, in a specific case, they want to use
this possibility or not. The new form is, as the French say, "a
prendre ou et laisser" (take it or leave it). I want to stress these two
features-the additional character and the nonobligatory charac-
" Actually there are 53 articles more since, in revising the previous draft, 79 articles
(marked with letters) were added and 26 articles were deleted.
"5 The new annexes include annex II, Rules for the election of members of the European
Works Council (20 articles) and annex III, Rules for the election of employees' representative
to the Supervisory Board (26 articles).
'1 1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1.
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ter-at the outset, as they facilitate to some extent the acceptance
of this new venture by the Member States represented in the Coun-
cil of Ministers. Compared with the harmonization of company
law-another activity of the Commission which is going on at the
same time-the uniform Statute leaves greater freedom to the
draftsmen. A directive of the European Communities is binding
upon the Member States who must implement its contents in their
national company law. This means a modification of municipal
company law. The Statute for the European Company does not
change national company law; it simply adds a new set of rules for
a new type of company which may be chosen for special purposes.
These purposes are all of an international character. Companies
of different national law (i.e., companies incorporated under the
company laws of at least two different Member States) may form
an S.E.:
a. by merging into an S.E.;
b. by forming an S.E. holding company;
c. by forming an S.E. joint subsidiary (joint venture).
In the case of a merger, the founding companies disappear and
their assets are automatically transferred to the S.E. The sharehold-
ers of the founders become automatically shareholders of the S.E.
Therefore, if a German Aktiengesellschaft (company limited by
shares) merges into an S.E. with a French Socit$ Anonyme, the
result is a neutral, European instrument. This neutrality eliminates
a psychological obstacle as compared with a convention on interna-
tional mergers for which, by article 220 of the Rome Treaty," the
Member States are instructed to work. This merger always ends up
in a company of municipal law. In the case of a merger into an S.E.,
no specific national company law must be chosen to govern the
company resulting from the merger. The result of the merger is not
a German or French company, but the neutral form of an S.E.
equally known, next to their municipal company law, in both coun-
tries. The 1975 Draft Statute underlines this neutrality concept by
also allowing the choice of more than one seat of the company. In
the example given, there could be a seat in France as well as in
Germany.
In the case of an S.E. holding company, the founding companies
incorporated under different national laws remain in existence. All
the shares of the founders are transferred to the holding company
" Note 9 supra.
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against issuance of holding shares. The shareholders of the founding
companies become automatically shareholders of the S.E. holding
company. The founders are transformed into 100 percent daughter
companies of the holding company. They continue their operations,
but now under the uniform direction of the S.E. holding company.
When a joint venture is formed by at least two founders of differ-
ent municipal law, the S.E. becomes the daughter company in
which the founders may participate on a 50-50 basis or in any other
proportion that they deem appropriate. The joint venture may be
used, for example, for common research, sales promotion, or for the
production of specific goods. It may also be, in its neutral form of
an S.E., the appropriate instrument to realize large projects such as
the construction of a tunnel under the Canal (English Channel) and
to raise the necessary capital for such a project in different coun-
tries." It is expected that the S.E. joint venture will be used by large
and medium-size companies for these areas. The merger and the
formation of a holding company in the form of an S.E., on the other
hand, entail more far-reaching consequences.
The founders of an S. E., in case of a merger or of the constitution
of an S.E. holding company, can be only public companies limited
by shares (Aktiengesellschaft, Soci6tO Anonyme). In the Member
States these companies are largely outnumbered by private compa-
nies limited by shares (G.m.b.H., in Germany; S. .r.1., in France
and Italy).'9 The restriction to the first category of companies lim-
ited by shares seems more than it actually is: in all Member States
companies of the second category can easily be transformed into
companies of the first category (with no tax problems involved) and
then participate in the formation of an S.E. by merger or by the
constitution of an S.E. holding company."
Enlargement was possible, however, and has been introduced in
the 1975 Draft Statute as far as the joint daughter company is
concerned. This joint subsidiary in the form of an S.E. now may be
formed not only by companies, but also by cooperative societies and
M The S.E., being on equal footing with companies of national law, should also have the
same access to the stock exchanges in different countries as companies of national law.
" Unlike the corporation laws of the United States, the municipal company laws in Europe
draw a distinction between the public company limited by shares and the private company
limited by shares. The main features of the latter comprise the restrictive transferability of
shares and a reduced disclosure of the annual accounts.
"' For the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom no such transformation is required.
See the commentary on article 2 under 2: in these countries "the difference between private
companies and other kinds of limited company is not such as to make special treatment
appear justified."
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other corporations governed by the public or private law of a Mem-
ber State having as its object the carrying on of economic activity.
The only restriction is that they must be incorporated under the
municipal law of a Member State and that at least two founders be
subject to different national laws (the international factor).
It may be asked why the formation of a joint subsidiary is re-
stricted to legal persons of the European Communities. The answer
may be that the S.E. first of all is conceived for the strengthening
of cooperation within the Common Market, and this with a view of
keeping up with competition from the outside. In practice, however,
outside companies are not prevented at all from making use of the
European Company. In order to form an S.E. joint subsidiary they
may make use of a subsidiary which they already have within the
Common Market or of the intermediary of a bank, which transfers
the shares-after formation of the S.E. -to its client." For a merger
into an S. E. or a formation of an S. E. holding company, the outside
corporation remains excluded. Even if the Commission would have
been willing to propose this extension (quod non!), this would have
been impossible for technical legal reasons. The exchange of shares
involved in these formations cannot be imposed by a regulation of
the European Communities on shareholders outside the Common
Market. Neither can the automatic transfer of assets to the S.E. be
imposed by a regulation on outside companies. The only (legally)
possible extension to outside companies remains, therefore, in the
important field of the joint subsidiary.
The minimum capital required for an S.E. joint venture amounts
to 100,000 Units of Accounts,2 which is not likely to constitute a
financial obstacle for large and medium-size companies operating
on the international level. The minimum capital required for the
two other forms of the S.E. will not create an hindrance either:
250,000 Units of Accounts for the S.E. merger and S.E. holding.
Compared with the 1970 Draft Statute, the access to the S.E. has
been enlarged considerably. Under the pressure of the European
Parliament and other critics the Commission has halved the mini-
mum capital, which originally was 500,000 Units of Accounts for the
merger and holding company and 250,000 for the joint subsidiary,
and it has expanded the circle of possible founders of an S.E. joint
subsidiary.
Finally, when dealing with the field of application, it should be
mentioned also that an S.E., once existing, can participate in the
" The S.E. is free to have bearer shares or registered shares or even both.
" The Unit of Account was originally equal to one United States dollar; today it is worth
about 30 percent more.
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formation of another S.E., together with other S.E.'s or the com-
panies incorporated under municipal law of Member States. This
applies to all the three types: merger, holding company, and joint
subsidiary. A peculiarity of the Statute is, however, that an S.E.
also may form, on its own, a 100 percent daughter S.E. This is the
first time that the formation of a company by one founder alone has
been recognized. In the Common Market the number of founders
required by national company acts varies from two to seven. So in
the Netherlands according to the Company Act the formation is to
be made by two. In practice, and accepted by the courts, a dummy
may function as the second. The Statute offers a more elegant solu-
tion which until now has not encountered any objection.
III. STRUCTURE OF THE S.E.
Sticking to my intention to describe only some of the main as-
pects of the S.E., I leave aside the regulations on the formation of
the S. E. These regulations are to be found partly in title I of the
"General Provisions" of the 1975 Draft Statute (also among those
are the provisions dealing with the access) and more specifically in
title II, "Formation." In this title the formation of the S.E. is regu-
lated in detail with regard to all eventualities: merger, holding com-
pany, joint subsidiary, and sole S.E. subsidiary. Leaving aside also
title III dealing with capital, shares, and debentures, I would like
to turn to title IV, entitled "Governing bodies.""3 The "governing
bodies" mentioned in this title are-in the sequence they are dealt
with-the Board of Management, the Supervisory Board, and the
General Meeting. Management comes first as, in practice, in the
functioning of a company it plays the most important role.
A. Board of Management
According to the 1975 Draft Statute all powers not reserved ex-
pressly to other bodies of the company belong to the management,
which acts collectively if it comprises more than one managing
director. Only physical persons, including foreigners, can be man-
aging directors. Here, fortunately, the restriction of the 1970 Draft
Statute, excluding foreigners when there would be no more than two
and requiring in all other cases that they should constitute a minor-
"3 The Statute contains 14 titles. While all of these interesting features could be mentioned,
however, a choice had to be made.
1, This term is used in the sense of persons not having the nationality of one of the Member
States.
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ity on the board, has been deleted.
According to Article 65, where the Board of Management com-
prises more than one member, each of them shall have authority to
represent the company in its dealings with third parties; provisions
in the articles of association to limit this power of representation
may not be relied upon to defeat claims of third parties. These
provisions therefore have only what is called an "internal effect."
The articles of association may provide that specified decisions of
the Board of Management, beyond those prescribed by Article 66,
shall require prior authorization of the Supervisory Board as well.2
Such restrictions have again only internal effect,26 even when the
transaction would fall outside the scope of the company's activi-
ties. 27 Third parties are thus fully protected. The Brussels First
Directive 2 is applied here to its fullest extent.
B. Supervisory Board
The most striking feature of the Statute, as far as the structure
of the company is concerned, consists in its option for the "two-tier"
system. This dual system has been known for some time in Germany
and the Netherlands, and since 1966 as an alternative possibility in
France.281. The choice has been inspired largely by the possibilities
which the dual system offers for solutions with respect to the most
difficult problem of all: employee participation in the management
of a company. Having next to the Board of Management a Supervi-
sory Board, the latter offers the possibility-as demonstrated in
Germany-of having the employee represented at the top of the
company. Starting with the 1966 Preliminary Draft Statute, the
Statute has always known this two-tier system.
11 1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1, art. 66, para. 3. Article 66 specifies the following issues:
(a) closure or transfer of establishments of the company or of appreciable parts thereof; (b)
substantial curtailment, extension or modification of the activities of the undertaking; (c)
substantial organizational changes within the undertaking; (d) establishment or termination
of long-term cooperation with other undertakings.
" Id. para. 4.
" Id. art. 65, para. 3: The company is bound by acts of the members of the Board of
Management "notwithstanding that such acts are connected with the objects of the company,
unless the acts are outside the functions of the Board of Management as provided by the
Statute."
" First Council Directive No. 68/151/EEC of March 9, 1968, 11 E.E.C.J.O. L65, at 8 (1968).
This Directive instructs the Member States of the EEC to introduce in their national com-
pany law protection of third parties. It is the only Directive to date that has entered into force.
Several other directives are still pending. The Second Directive is expected to enter into force
soon.
'" Loi n.66-537 du 24 juillet 1966, sur les soci~tes commerciales, [1966] J.O. 642, [1966]
D.S.L. 265.
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Under the two-tier system the Supervisory Board, regardless
whether there is employee representation or not, supervises the day-
to-day management of the managing directors and advises them on
main issues. On some main issues the management cannot even
make a decision without prior authorization by the Supervisory
Board. These issues may be enumerated in a company act, in the
articles of association, or in both. This last solution has been intro-
duced in the Statute, as explained above. Long term policy is thus
discussed with the management in meetings of the Supervisory
Board, which meets with the managing directors at regular inter-
vals, at least four times a year but, in practice, perhaps eight or even
ten times a year. Under the one board system a distinction can be
made between the so-called outside directors and the inside direc-
tors. The outside directors could be compared with members of the
Supervisory Board under the two-tier system. Under the dual sys-
tem the tasks of the members of each board are more clearly distin-
guished, permitting a clearer distinction between the responsibility
of the members of both bodies. The foregoing consideration may
also induce those countries accustomed to the one board system to
accept, as far as the S.E. is concerned, the two-tier system.
The debate centers on the composition of the Supervisory Board
and more specifically on the representation of labor on this board.
Originally all members of the Supervisory Board were appointed by
the general meeting of shareholders. However, after World War II,
in the Federal Republic of Germany at the instigation of the Oc-
cupying Powers, the representation of the employees on the Super-
visory Board (Aufsichtsrat) was introduced: the so-called codeter-
mination (Mitbestimmung). 1 It was a daring step when, in 1970, the
Commission introduced the Mitbestimmung in its proposal for the
European Company: one-third of the members of the Supervisory
Board should be employees' representatives. I called this a daring
step as, at that moment, only one out of the six Member States
knew of this type of labor participation at the top of a company. In
the meantime the evolution went on. In 1971 the Netherlands intro-
duced a system of their own for the so-called large companies. 0
" Two types must be distinguished: the 50-50 Mitbestimmung in the coal and steel indus-
try (1950) and the one-third Mitbestimmung in other cases (1951). The first type is also called
"qualified co-determination" (qualifizierte Mitbestimmung). Labor was regarded as a coun-
tervailing power that would constrain capital from developing those industries again as in-
struments for warfare.
Wetboek van Koophandel (Commercial Code) §§ 52a-52o, introduced by Wijziging van
het Wetboek van Koophandel; Voorziening met betrekking tot de structuur der N.V. en B.V.
(Amendment to the Commercial Code; Provisions relating to the structure of the N.V. and
B.V.) of May 6, 1971, [1971] Staatsblad (Official Gazette) 289. These sections have been
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Denmark:" followed in 1973, permitting the workers of a company
with at least 50 employees to appoint two members on the Board of
Directors, the majority always to be appointed'by the general meet-
ing of shareholders. In 1974 Luxembourg32 introduced the one-third
representation for a certain category of companies. Germany 33 re-
cently decided to make a general rule of the equal representation of
labor and capital, which was until now reserved for companies of the
coal and steel industry only. These developments, briefly mentioned
here, are indicative of the trend in Western Europe.34
Against this background it might be better understood why, in the
amended proposal for the European Company of 1975, the Commis-
sion made another step forward with respect to the composition of
the Supervisory Board. Actually this step resulted from the exten-
sive discussions that took place in the European Parliament in 1974.
The solution accepted by a great majority of the parliamentarians
and now incorporated in the amended Statute for the European
Company is the following.
The Supervisory Board of the S.E. must be composed of at least
three members and, when the S.E. has establishments in several
Member States, which usually will be the case, it must be composed
of at least nine members. The number of board members to be fixed
in the articles of association must always be uneven and divisible
by three. One-third of the members will be appointed by the share-
holders; one-third will be representatives of the employees; the last
third will be co-opted by the other two. This is, in principle, the
system in broad outline. It means equal representation of labor and
capital (each one-third) and a kind of mediating last third, co-opted
by the first two and therefore apparently enjoying the confidence of
both sides (labor and capital). This system has been elaborated by
transposed as of July 1, 1976 to Burgelijk Wetboek (Civil Code) book 2, division 6, §§ 153-65
(1976). This only applies to approximately 300 companies. It would go too far, in the context
of this article, to describe the Netherlands system in detail. However, it found its recognition
in the draft for a Fifth Directive, dealing with the structure of public companies, where the
Dutch system has been made optional next to the one-third German system.
1 Lov om aktieselkaber (Companies Act), Act no. 370 of June 13, 1973, § 49. A German
translation of the Act can be found in DAs DXNISCHE GESETZ OBER AKTIENGESELLSCHAFTEN,
Auslindische Aktiengesetze, band 6 (2d ed. 1976).
.1 Loi du 6 mai 1974 instituant des comitks mixtes dans les enterprises du secteur priv6 et
organisant la representation des salaries dans les socidtds anonymes (Act of May 6, 1974
establishing mixed committees in private enterprises and organizing the representation of the
employees at the limited liability companies), Memorial A no. 35 du 10 mai 1974, in force on
August 1, 1974.
3 Mitbestimmungsgesetz (Law concerning the codetermination), May 4, 1976, in force July
1, 1976, 11976] Bundesgesetzblatt May 8.
11 For a more detailed description see Employee Participation and Company structure, 8
BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Supp. No. 8 (1975).
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the Commission-again on the basis of the discussions and resolu-
tions as accepted in the European Parliament-in the 1975 Draft
Statute.
The representatives of the shareholders are appointed, of course,
by the General Meeting. The articles of association, however, may
contain a regulation which offers a minority of shareholders the
possibility to appoint a member of the board." Otherwise only can-
didates of the majority would be chosen.
The representatives of the employees are chosen by the parties of
the S.E. and of the companies controlled by the S.E. according to
the "Rules for Election" contained in annex III of the 1975 Draft
Statute. These rules provide for direct elections in case the S.E.
comprises only one establishment. Normally, the S.E., and cer-
tainly if it also controls other undertakings, will be comprised of
more than one establishment. In the latter case the electoral dele-
gates first of all are chosen by the workers of the establishments: two
members for each establishment and, if the establishment employs
more than 100 workers, one member more for every 100 workers. The
electoral delegates may not be bound by voting instructions. They
elect by free and secret ballots the employees' representatives on the
Supervisory Board. If only three representatives must be chosen,
one may come from outside of the S. E. or a company controlled by
the S.E. The representative may, for example, be an official of a
trade union. If more than three representatives are to be appointed,
two of them may come from outside the S.E. or its controlled com-
panies.
Both groups-the representatives of the shareholders and those of
the employees-have the task to agree on the co-optation of the
remaining one-third. Candidates for this last one-third may be pro-
posed by the general meeting, by the management, and by the
"employees' representative body." By this is meant the European
Works Council which I shall consider later.36 The only persons quali-
fied to be candidates on behalf of this third part are those "who are
not directly dependent on the shareholders, the employees or their
organizations."37 Apart from this negative criterion, the Statute re-
quires that the candidate "represent general interests and possess
the necessary knowledge and experience." ' '38 Neither the discussion
in the European Parliament nor the Commission's commentary on
11 In this respect the American system of cumulative voting was mentioned.
31 In the (exceptional) case that there would not be a European Works Council the Statute
regulates to whom then belongs the right of proposal. 1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1, art.
75a, par. 2.
"7 Id. art. 75a, para. 3.
39 Id.
378 [Vol. 6:367
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the Statute make clear exactly what is meant by this. On the con-
trary, according to the commentary this is left vague on purpose, in
order to facilitate the election of appropriate and independent mem-
bers. The mediatory role of this third part has also been expressed
in the commentary where it expects the co-opted members to find,
in conflict situations, solutions which do full justice to all interests
involved."
The third body dealt with in title IV-the General Meeting of
shareholders- also shows some particular features when compared
with the regulation in municipal company acts. For example, the
Statute' enumerates in an exclusive list the powers which belong
to the general meeting. This list contains 12 issues on which the
general meeting must decide, including, for example, the increase
or reduction of capital, modification of the articles of association,
and merger with another company. On three other issues the au-
thorization of the general meeting is required. 1
A proxy can be given only for one general meeting (or its follow-
up), but members of the Supervisory Board and members of the
Board of Management or salaried employees of the company or its
dependent undertaking may not act as proxies. Solicitation of prox-
ies is regulated in detail in article 88a.
In the general meeting the shareholders have the right to be in-
formed by the management of information necessary for the proper
discussion of items in the agenda; refusal to supply such informa-
tion may lead to an action in court.42 Voting agreements are allowed,
but must be communicated to the company (failure may incur the
penalty of having the votes which were cast nullified); the S.E. must
make mention of the voting agreements in the annual report. 3
These are some of the main features concerning the three bodies
of the S. E. dealt with in title IV. The functioning of the S. E. cannot
be understood, however, without taking into account the European
Works Council (EWC), dealt with in title V. There are issues on
which the Supervisory Board cannot give its authorization without
knowing the opinion of the EWC. On other issues the Board of
Managing Directors cannot decide without having first heard the
EWC. Finally, some decisions by management can be taken only
3' A candidate must acquire a two-thirds majority. In case after a third vote (always on
the basis of new proposals) this majority is not reached, the Statute provides for an arbitral
tribunal to make the appointment. Id. art. 75b.
Id. art. 83.
In id. art. 83, para. 2, we find a similar provision as in id. art. 66, para. 4, for the
protection of third parties. See note 28 supra.
4 1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1, art. 90.
' Id. art. 93.
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with the plain approval of the EWC. There exists, therefore, a clear
interplay between management, the Supervisory Board, and the
EWC. Although dealt with in a separate title, title V under the
heading "Representation of employees in the S.E.," the EWC can,
in my opinion, be regarded as a body of the S.E. as well.
IV. EUROPEAN WORKS COUNCIL
Another aspect of the participation of the workers in the decision-
making process is to be found in the European Works Council. In
the previous chapter I dealt with the participation of labor at the
top of the S.E. in the Supervisory Board. Here the Statute presents
a rather progressive solution, only to be compared with the situation
in Germany and, to a lesser extent, in Holland, Luxembourg, and
Denmark. On the other hand, participation of the workers also takes
place on another level. Works Councils are to be established in all
of the Member States of the European Communities with the excep-
tion of the United Kingdom and Ireland. Their organization, func-
tioning, and powers may differ, but the institution as such is known
in the greater part of the EEC.44
These works councils remain in existence in the establishments
the S.E. may have in different countries. In addition to them an
EWC is formed when the S.E. has at least two establishments in
different EEC countries, if each establishment employs at least 50
workers. Members of the EWC are chosen by the workers of those
establishments. The elections take place in accordance with new
uniform Rules for Election. 5
The number of representatives each establishment may elect de-
pends on the number of workers in the establishment: one may be
elected by establishments with 50 to 199 workers; five of those with
3000 to 4999 workers.4" In case more representatives must be elected,
a system of proportional representation applies.47 In this way each
establishment elects its representatives to the EWC by direct and
secret voting. Indirect elections for the EWC-election through the
intermediary of the national works councils-were rejected by the
European Parliament."
" For an enumeration see id. annex I.
," See id. annex II which forms, like annex III (election of workers' representatives to the
Supervisory Board), an integral part of the Statute. Both the European Parliament and the
Association of Free Trade Unions insisted on a uniform regulation of the elections for the
EWC.
, See the scale in id. art. 103.
According to the so-called systeme d'Hondt. See id. annex II, arts. 5-6 (and commentar-
ies to the annex).
11 We still maintain indirect elections for the representatives of the employees on the
Supervisory Board. These are elected by electoral delegates who in their turn are elected by
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The powers of the EWC can be divided into:
a. A right to be informed;
b. A right to be consulted before management makes a decision;
c. A right of approval.
Its right to be informed is phrased in broad terms in article 120.
Management must inform the EWC in quarterly reports on the
economic and financial situation of the S.E., its production and
investment programmes, its plans for rationalization, and "any
other fact or project which may have an appreciable effect on the
interests of the employees of the S.E."4" Moreover, the EWC re-
ceives all communications and documents which the shareholders
receive and may request written information from the Board of
Management on any matter it deems essential for the interest of the
workers.
The EWC elects its chairman from among its members. It meets
at regular intervals (but at least four times each year) with the
Board of Management for joint discussions. Also, the EWC may
invite any member of the Board of Management to its meetings and
request him to provide information or an explanation concerning
certain business operations.
The right of consultation has been regulated in articles 124 and
125. The Board of Management is obliged to consult the EWC be-
fore making any decision concerning job evaluation, rates of wages
per job or for piece work, or the introduction of technical devices
intended to control the conduct or performance of employees."0 Any
decision taken without such consultation is void. The EWC also
must be consulted on the same issues as mentioned in article 66,
where it is stated that the Board of Management cannot make a
decision on these issues without the approval of the Supervisory
Board. Article 125 provides that the Supervisory Board shall not
give its approval until the EWC has expressed its opinion on the
following important items: (1) the closure or transfer of establish-
ments; (2) the substantial curtailment, extension, or change of the
activities of the undertaking; (3) substantial organizational changes
within the undertaking; and (4) the establishment of long-term co-
operation with other undertakings, or the termination thereof.
Decisions on the important issues of article 125-take, for exam-
the employees of the establishments. See notes 29-39 supra and accompanying text for a
discussion of the composition of the Supervisory Board.
" 1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1, art. 120, para. 2.
Id. art. 124.
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ple, the concentration of the production of a certain product in one
factory and the closing of similar factories elsewhere-may have
considerable influence on the labor situation in the S.E. as a whole.
A social plan may be made by the Board of Management in a case
like this, which will serve as a basis for its deliberations with the
EWC. According to the new article 126a, inserted at the instigation
of the European Parliament, the Board of Management in such a
case not only is obliged to consult the EWC, but also "if the EWC
considers that the employees' interests will be adversely affected by
the proposed decision of the Board of Management," it must go one
step further. Management must try "to reach agreement (with the
EWC) on the steps to be taken with regard to employees." 5 The
Supervisory Board will be informed whether an agreement on these
measures could be reached. If an agreement is not reached, the
Supervisory Board, on which the employees are represented as well,
may nevertheless give its approval. Thereafter the EWC within one
month may resort to arbitration. The arbitrators cannot reverse the
decision approved by the Supervisory Board. Their authority is lim-
ited to a decision of the dispute between the Board of Management
and the EWC concerning the measures to be taken with regard to
the employees involved.
Finally there are some decisions, enumerated in article 123 and
all concerning social matters, which the management cannot make
without the approval of the EWC. These include, for example, the
rules relating to the recruitment, promotion and dismissal of em-
ployees, and measures in the field of industrial safety, health, and
hygiene. A decision of the management on these matters without
approval of the EWC is void. If the EWC refuses to give its approval,
the management can resort to arbitration and the arbitration board
will decide on the merits of the case.
Apart from these two references to arbitration (in case of no agree-
ment on the social plan or no approval on the social matters of
article 123), the arbitration board is competent to settle all ques-
tions of procedure in matters requiring consultation with or the
provision of information to the EWC52 and in disputes between the
EWC and the national employees' representative bodies. 53 The arbi-
tration board shall be composed of assessors, half of whom shall be
appointed by the EWC and half by the Board of Management of the
" d. art. 126a, para. 1.
, Id. art. 128, para. 1.
"I Id. art. 129, para. 1.
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S.E. (or the national employees' representative body), with the im-
partial chairman to be appointed by mutual agreement between the
parties. In default of agreement as to the appointment of the chair-
man or as to the assessors in general, they shall be appointed by the
court within whose jurisdiction the registered office of the company
is situated. 4
The task of the EWC has been defined and limited in article 119:
the EWC shall confine itself to deal with matters which concern
several establishments, situated in the territory of several Member
States; moreover, the matters should not be capable of solution by
the national works councils existing in these establishments. As
stated earlier, the works councils which are set up in the individual
establishments of the S.E. in accordance with the provisions of na-
tional law continue to exist.5 Matters which concern only one par-
ticular establishment are to be dealt with by the representative
body formed under national law. The same applies when the matter
concerns more than one establishment situated in one country; the
central works council of national law5" will deal with it. The EWC
is meant to function only on an international (European) level when
the matters concern the S.E. as a whole or matters concerning sev-
eral establishments situated in several countries of the EEC Mem-
ber States.
The same article 119 contains a second limitation on the compe-
tence of the EWC. It dictates a "hands off" rule for the EWC with
regard to matters regulated in collective agreements between the
S.E. and the trade unions. This first of all applies to collective
agreements concluded on the national level. Their provisions apply
only to the establishments situated in the country concerned. How-
ever, the Statute also authorizes the S.E. to conclude such agree-
ments on a European level; labor conditions may be regulated by
collective agreements made between the S.E. and the trade unions
represented in their establishments." This provision presupposes a
closer cooperation between trade unions of different countries than
has existed generally until now.
The EWC, although in this way restricted in its activities to safe-
guarding the interests of the workers on an international level, plays
such an important role in the functioning of the S.E., as explained
Id. arts. 128, para. 2, 129, para. 2.
Id. art. 101.
" For an enumeration see id. annex I.
17 Id. art. 146.
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earlier, that, in my opinion, this institution should be regarded as
another body of the S.E. The EWC has been regulated in a separate
title (title V). Systematic reasons can be given for this. In actual
functioning, however, the EWC does not differ from the "bodies of
the S.E." as regulated in title IV.
V. S.E. -CONCERN
The 1975 Draft Statute also contains, in title VII, a regulation for
a group of companies of which a S.E. forms a part, either as the
controlling undertaking or as a dependent company. For the Mem-
ber States of the European Communities this is quite new. Only the
Federal Republic of Germany has a complete regulation of this sub-
ject in its company law. The Statute therefore largely draws its
inspiration from the German example.
For the European Company the phenomenon of a "group of
companies" could not be ignored. The economic reality had to be
faced that an increasing number of companies no longer function as
isolated units, but in close cooperation with other companies. The
company laws of the Member States, with the exception of Ger-
many, still neglect this reality. They treat the company in its iso-
lated form. Special problems arise, however, when this is no longer
the case and we must recognize the situation that one company
controls others. It is the following situation which the Statute has
in view in title VII: companies cooperating in a group under the
unified management of a controlling company with one of them
being an S.E.5
Whether this situation exists, i.e., whether there exists a "unified
management of the controlling undertaking," largely depends on
the facts. No definition of "unified management" could be given.
The Statute introduces, however, the presumption that a group (in
the meaning of the Statute) exists when the controlling company
controls more than half of the votes exercisable with respect to the
whole of the issued capital or has, directly or indirectly, a majority
shareholding, or the power to appoint more than half of the Board
of Management or of the Supervisory Board of the dependent under-
taking. 9 The question whether a group in the meaning of the Stat-
ute exists is important enough in view of the consequences its exist-
ence entails. Therefore the Court of Justice of the European Com-
Id. art. 223.
" Id. art. 223, para. 2 iuncto art. 6.
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munities can be approached to decide the matter." In this manner
a uniform decision on this important question is guaranteed.
The main consequences to which I referred are to be found in the
protection of outside shareholders' and the protection of creditors"2
with, as a counterpart, the right of the controlling company to give
instructions to the management of dependent undertakings."
These consequences apply to the relationship between a control-
ling S.E. and dependent companies within the Common Market.
They also apply to the relationship between a dependent S.E. and
a controlling undertaking without regard to where its registered off-
ice is situated."5 Finally, the scope of application of title VII has
been extended in the 1975 Draft Statute to a dependent S.E. in its
relationship to companies within the Common Market and con-
trolled by that S.E. (subgroup). With respect to these companies
the (dependent) S.E. is regarded as the controlling undertaking of
a group. Therefore, the scope of application of title VII now extends
to cover the situation when a subgroup is controlled by an S.E.
A. Protection of Outside Shareholders
The controlling company will exercise its influence on the depen-
dent undertakings from the viewpoint of the total interests of the
group. This could easily conflict with the interests of outside share-
holders of the dependent companies. These outside shareholders
are, therefore, according to article 228, offered an opportunity to
quit the dependent company "within a reasonable time after a
group of companies comes into existence or after a company is de-
clared to be a dependent company within such a group by the Court
of Justice of the European Communities."
The controlling company, whether an S.E. or a company limited
by shares formed under the law of a Member State, then must offer
the outside shareholders either an appropriate cash payment for
their shares or an exchange of their shares for shares or convertible
debentures of the controlling company. Where the controlling com-
pany is a company from outside the Common Market, an offer for
Id. art. 225.
The protection of outside shareholders is regulated in section 3 of title VII of the 1975
Draft Statute, supra note 1.
" The protection of creditors is regulated in id. title VH, section 5.
" Id. title VII, section 6.
" Id. art. 224, para. 1.
" Id. para. 2.
" Id. para. 3.
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cash payment always must be made. In both cases a double offer
may be made, cash payment or exchange of shares, leaving the
choice to the outside shareholders. In addition, in all these situa-
tions, the controlling company is obliged to offer the outside share-
holders the alternative option of "annual equalization payments
calculated in proportion to the nominal value of their shares." 7
The Statute regulates in detail the procedure to be followed once
such an offer has been made. The Board of Management of the
dependent group company must, immediately thereafter, appoint
one or more independent experts and instruct them to prepare a
report for the outside shareholders."' The Board of Management
itself must draw up a report in which it comments on the report
made by the experts and it may make, as the case may be, its own
proposals. Finally, a general meeting must be convened to decide
whether the offer should be accepted. In this meeting no votes shall
be cast with respect to shares held, directly or indirectly, by the
controlling company. Nonvoting shares have the right to vote in this
case.69
A three-quarters majority is required for the acceptance of the
offer. If the general meeting rejects the offer wholly or partly, the
terms of the offer shall be determined, without right of appeal, by
the court. If the general meeting has accepted the offer its decision
may still be attacked in court by holders of not less than 20 percent
of the shares having the right to vote. Such an attack can be based
only on the ground that the cash payment, the share exchange ratio,
or the annual equalization payments are not fair and reasonable. If
such is the case, the terms of the offer shall be determined by the
court without right of appeal. The acceptance of the offer by the
general meeting or, when court proceedings follow, the judgment of
the court must be published by the Board of Management of the
dependent company. Within 3 months thereafter every outside
shareholder shall be entitled to require payment in cash or the ex-
change of his shares. Those who do not exercise these rights receive
the annual equalization payments.70
7 Id. art. 228, para. 2. This is commonly called a dividend guarantee.
1 On application of 5 percent of the outside shareholders, the court may appoint other
experts if the experts are not sufficiently independent.
" The Statute recognizes in title 11 the creation of nonvoting shares up to one-half of the
capital (fully paid up). 1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1, art. 49.
7" For a more detailed explanation of the procedure just described see id. arts. 232-37.
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B. Buying Out of Outside Shareholders
Compared with the 1970 Draft Statute,7 the 1975 Draft Statute12
contains a novum in paragraphs a and b of article 238. These articles
regulate the situation where the controlling company has acquired
90 percent or more of the shares of the dependent one. When this
situation has arisen, it must be published. The controlling company
may then force the remaining small percentage of outside share-
holders to leave the company against cash payment or exchange of
shares. On the other hand, each individual outside shareholder,
upon publication of the 90 percent (or more) situation, also may
require that his shares be bought out. This seems to me to be a
useful addition, not contained in many of the national company
laws of the Member States."
C. Protection of Creditors
The protection of creditors, dealing with dependent group compa-
nies, is regulated in article 239 of the 1975 Draft Statute. The con-
trolling undertaking is liable for the debts and liabilities of depen-
dent group companies. Nevertheless, proceedings may be brought
against the controlling company only where the creditor has first
made a "written demand for payment from the dependent group
company and failed to obtain satisfaction."7 These words are not
explained in the commentary. In my opinion they do not imply that
legal action first should be taken against the dependent company.75
A written demand for payment, which remained unsuccessful, is
enough. Although the creditor may fall back on the controlling com-
pany for debts of the dependent group company, article 224, dealing
with the scope of application, should not be overlooked. According
to the first paragraph of this article the S. E., as controlling company
of the group, is only liable for the debts of dependent "common
market" group companies. " The controlling S.E. is therefore, to
7 Note 2 supra.
' Note 1 supra.
71 Only Germany, Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom have similar regulations.
7 1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1, art. 239, para. 2.
71 According to the commentary on the 1970 Draft Statute, supra note 2, this was required
under the text, then reading: "only where the creditor proves that he has endeavoured, and
failed, to obtain payment of his debt." Id. art. 239, para. 2 (emphasis added).
71 Sections 3 to 6 (creditor protection is section 5) only apply, if the S.E. is controlling, to
"dependent companies in the group which have been formed under the laws of Member
States, and to their relationship with the controlling S.E.." 1975 Draft Statute, supra note
1, art. 224, para. 1.
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give an example, not liable for the debts of a Brazilian dependent
company.
D. Instructions
The right to issue instructions to the Board of Management of a
dependent group company-which instructions shall be complied
with by that Board-forms the counterpart of the guarantees which
the controlling company has to offer to the outside shareholders and
to the creditors of the dependent company. The moment the depen-
dent company has published the amount of the cash payment, the
amount of the annual equalization payments, and, where appropri-
ate, the share exchange ratio as approved by the general meeting or
determined by the court, the guarantees towards the outside share-
holders are definitely known and simultaneously the right of in-
structions is born.77 In exercising this right to issue instructions the
members of the Board of Management of the controlling company
"shall exercise the standard of care required of a conscientious man-
ager and shall promote the interests of the group and of its person-
nel." It is the interests of the group and of its personnel taken in
its entirety by which the top management must be guided. These
overall considerations outweigh the interests of individual group
members.
A special problem arises when the management of the dependent
company, having received an instruction from the controlling S. E.,
also needs for this specific issue the approval of its own Supervisory
Board. What if the consent is refused? In that case-so the Statute
indicates-the instruction must only be complied with if consent is
obtained from the Supervisory Board of the S.E. If in the reverse
situation the S.E. is controlled by an undertaking formed under
national law, the powers remain unaffected. Only if the employees
of the dependent S.E. are represented at the top of the controlling
undertaking "in a manner equivalent to that in which they are
represented under the rules governing the S.E. 7 may the Supervi-
sory Board of the S.E. be overruled.
E. The Group Works Council
The Statute also provides for the formation of a Group Works
7 Id. art. 240.
7 Id. art. 240a.
7 Id. art. 240, para. 3.
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Council (GWC). 0 According to article 130,1 a GWC shall be formed
when the group controlled by the S. E. comprises at least two under-
takings with their registered offices within the Member States and
each of them having at least 50 employees.12 The members of the
GWC are selected indirectly. The representative bodies referred to
in article 131-among which the EWC for European companies and
for group undertakings incorporated under national law the central
employees' representative bodies-appoint delegates to the GWC in
accordance with the scale mentioned in article 132.
The competence of the GWC extends only to matters concerning
the group or a number of undertakings within this group and which
cannot be settled by the central employees' representative bodies in
the group undertaking. 3 If decisions by the Board of Management
of the S.E. on matters referred to in articles 123 to 125 (dealt with
earlier) affect several undertakings within a group, the GWC acts
in place of the EWC. 4 An arbitration board shall be established
along the same lines as the arbitration board provided for the EWC.
This board shall settle disputes between the GWC and the Board
of Management of the controlling S.E. as well as disputes between
the GWC and the EWC or employees' representative bodies in
group undertakings controlled by the S.E.15
VI. ANNUAL ACCOUNTS
Title VI deals with the preparation of the annual accounts. It is
by far the most extensive title of all, including articles 148 to 222.88
The provisions of this title have been adapted to the amended pro-
posal of a fourth directive.87 The Commission also has under prepa-
" The provisions of articles 107-118 dealing with the term of office of the members of the
EWC and the operation of the EWC also apply to the GWC, id. art. 113.
" The GWC is not governed by provisions of title VII ("Groups of Companies") of the 1975
Draft Statute, supra note 1, but of title V ("Representation of Employees in the European
Company"). Id. arts. 130-36.
" This shall apply even if such controlling S.E. is itself controlled by another undertaking
within a group (the subgroup situation). Only if the employees of the S.E. and of group
undertakings controlled by it are represented in such controlling undertaking "by a body
equivalent to the Group Works Council of the S.E.," no such GWC must be formed at the
level of the S.E. Id. art. 130.
Id. art. 134, para. 2.
Id. art. 135, para. 2.
Id. art. 136.
' The 1975 Draft Statute added 9 articles to these 74 articles, therefore including 83
articles out of a total of 337. See note 14 supra.
" The annual accounts of limited liability companies amended proposal for a Fourth
Directive, 15 E.E.C. J.O. C7, at 11 (1972), as amended, 7 BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUN-
ITIES Supp. No. 6 (1974). The title also was adapted to some of the provisions of the Fifth
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ration a draft directive on the preparation of group accounts. On its
completion the relevant provisions of title VI5 will have to be
adapted accordingly. This title therefore shows clearly how much
the work done in Brussels in this field of company law is interre-
lated.
Title VI is of a highly technical nature. There can be no question
of dealing in detail with the subject matter of this title. In the
context of this article I can only mention some of its aspects. From
the beginning it has been the object to require extensive information
from the S. E. with regard to its financial position. The relevant
provisions may require more information from the S.E. than limited
liability companies of national law must give, but certainly not less.
This information is contained in the balance sheet, the profit and
loss account, the notes on the accounts, and (new in the 1975 Draft
Statute at the suggestion of the European Parliament) a statement
of source and application of funds. These documents together con-
stitute the whole of the annual accounts."9 In addition, the Board
of Management must present an annual report' which represents
its personal judgment on the development and future prospects of
the company. The annual account and the annual report-insofar
as it reviews developments of the past financial year-are audited
by an independent auditor.9
The annual accounts and report (with the auditor's report an-
nexed thereto) are submitted by the Board of Management to the
Supervisory Board. The annual accounts shall be approved by the
Board of Management and by the Supervisory Board in a joint
meeting but by separate voting.2 Only if an agreement between the
two is not reached will the annual accounts need approval by the
General Meeting.9 3
If the accounts are approved by the Board of Management and
the Supervisory Board, as normally will be the case, they may ap-
propriate up to 50 percent of the profit of the year. 4 Usually the two
bodies will agree and most likely will appropriate up to 50 percent
Directive concerning the structure of socitssanonymes, 15 E.E.C.JO. C131, at 49, 61(1972).
1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1, title VI, section 6.
[d. art. 148.
Id, art. 195.
Id, art. 203.
, Id, art. 213. The annual report is the sole responsibility of the Board of Management.
Id. art. 214.
Id. art. 217.
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of the year's profit to reserves (self-financing of the company). The
general meeting then decides on the remaining profit upon a joint
proposal of the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board.
However, in case the Board of Management and the Supervisory
Board do not agree on the appropriation of profits as entrusted to
them, the general meeting decides as to the appropriation of the
total profit of the year. The same applies in case the annual ac-
counts as such must be approved, pursuant to article 214, by the
general meeting. In that (exceptional) case the general meeting
therefore shall approve as well the annual accounts as appropriate
the total profit of the year. 5
The system, as described here, has been incorporated in the pro-
ject for the S.E. right from the beginning. There is a close connec-
tion between full disclosure of the company's financial situation and
profits on the one side and the possibility, if agreed upon between
the Board of Management and the Supervisory Board, to appropri-
ate half of the profit of the year to reserves. Full disclosure should
not induce shareholders, for their part, to demand distribution of a
profit which might threaten the company's future development, if
not its very existence. To meet this situation the 50 percent limit
has been introduced as a safety valve. This again corresponds with
the percentage of distributed profit which tends not to exceed 50
percent and in many cases is considerably less.
VII. CONCLUSION
I hope my survey will give at least some impression of the main
aspects of this project for a European Company. I have dealt with
some of the history and the field of application of the S.E. The
structure of the S.E., its two-tier system, and the composition of the
Supervisory Board with employees' representation, as well as a de-
scription of the European Works Council, which actually functions
as a fourth organ of the S.E. next to the Board of Management, the
Management, Supervisory Board, and the General Meeting have
been discussed. The part of the Statute dealing with the not un-
likely situation that the S.E. will be, either as a controlling or as a
dependent company, part of a group of companies, has been exam-
ined. Finally some company law aspects of the annual accounts
were highlighted.
'" I have not mentioned that a new article 216a requires that 5 percent of the year's net
profit must be transferred to the legal reserves until the reserves are equal to at least 10
percent of the subscribed capital.
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Many other subjects are dealt with in the Draft Statute. Title III
deals in detail with capital (increase and reduction of capital),
shares (bearer or registered), and debentures. Title VIII deals with
the alteration of the statutes (articles of association) and title IX
with the dissolution, liquidation, and bankruptcy of the S.E. The
transformation of an S.E. into a limited company incorporated
under the law of one of the Member States, the way back into a
national regime, forms the subject of title X. An S.E., once existing,
may merge with other S.E.'s or limited companies formed under the
law of the Member States. This subject is dealt with in title XI. The
merger might take place either by forming a new S.E. in accordance
with the provisions of the statute, by the acquisition by the S.E. of
one or more limited companies" or the reverse, by the acquisition
of an S.E. by a limited company formed under national law97 or by
the formation of a new limited company under the law of one of the
Member States. Apart from two final provisions," title XII deals
with taxation and title XIII (one article only, referring to annex IV)
to offences.
Taxation, of course, is a very important subject. The S.E. should
not have a privileged position, however, as far as its tax position is
concerned. The tax provisions in title XII therefore start from the
principle of tax neutrality. In elaborating this part of the Statute,
the Commission based itself largely on two draft directives pre-
sented to the Council of Ministers on January 15, 1969:
a. Draft Directive on the common system of taxation applicable
to mergers, the splitting up of companies and the transfer of assets
taking place between companies of different Member States; °0
b. Draft Directive on the common taxation arrangements ap-
plicable to parent companies and subsidiary companies of different
Member States.'0 '
These two directives are still in the process of being made. When
they finally will have been approved the provisions of title XII will
be adapted accordingly.
Still other things remain to be done before the European Com-
pany can be put into operation. The European Commercial Regis-
ter, where the S.E. will be registered and all necessary information
" 1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1, title XI, section 2.
'; Id. section 3.
Id. section 4.
" Id. title XIV.
12 E.E.C. JO. C39, at 1 (1969).
12 E.E.C. J.O. C39, at 7 (1969).
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about the company can be found, must be organized. This central
register, with supplementary registers in the Member States, will be
attached to the Court of Justice Of the European Communities.
Rules for its functioning must be drawn up by the Council of Minis-
ters on the proposal of the Commission.12 Also, the Court of Justice
(the central jurisdiction for the interpretation of the Statute and
referred to in several articles of the Statute) 3 probably will have to
adapt its organization in order to be able to fulfill the tasks en-
trusted to it under the Statute.
Besides these technical matters there are other matters of a more
fundamental character which need to be solved, such as the ques-
tion of whether the S.E. should have a free choice between shares
in bearer or in registered form. Italy is of the opinion that the S.E.
should only have registered shares. Other Member States deem this
undesirable as it will make it more difficult to deal with the shares
on the securities market. The Commission maintained the free
choice in article 50 of the Statute after approval by the European
Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee.04 Also, the
regulation of the group of companies, although more flexible in the
1975 Draft Statute than before, still cannot be expected to meet
general approval. Being unfamiliar with it, most Member States are
hesitant to accept a regulation which, by its nature, inevitably will
be rather complicated.
However, the main obstacle the S.E. has encountered on its way
to realization until now consists in the regulation of the employees'
participation. The proposal for the Fifth Directive on the structure
of public companies must face the same problems and perhaps even
more as it mandates employees' participation at board level in the
national company laws of the Member States. On this subject the
national views still differ greatly although some rapproch6ment may
be noticed during the last years as shown in the green book, just
published by the Commission.' 5
',2 1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1, art. 8.
To give some examples: The Court of Justice has to examine whether the formalities
required for the formation of an S.E. have been complied with (id. art. 17). The Court also
may be approached for a decision as to whether there exists a group of companies (id. art.
225). The Court also controls the alteration of the statutes of an S.E. (id. art. 245) and may
determine the tax domicile of the S.E., which depends on where "the centre of its effective
management is located" in case the competent authorities in the Member States do not agree
thereon (id. art. 276).
"' See the commentary on article 50 in the 1975 Draft Statute, supra note 1.
"m Note 13 supra.
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Although I do not underestimate the difficulties still to be sur-
mounted, in my opinion they all will be overcome in the end. The
problem of employees' participation must be solved at any rate,
both on the national level, where it plays its part in all Member
States although in some more than in others, and on the interna-
tional level of the S.E. In this context, the Statute has the advan-
tage of not being obligatory. The S.E. is offered for optional use by
international cooperation and integration. Introducing a progressive
solution for employees' representation in the Statute for the Euro-
pean Company under these circumstances may be more readily ac-
ceptable although it cannot be denied that, in those countries where
this representation is unknown, it could still have some influence as
a precedent.
Creating a new company form of uniform law directly applicable
in all nine Member States of the European Communities and, in
last resort, uniformly interpreted by its Court of Justice, is an
ambitious venture. It adds for specific purposes, as explained ear-
lier, a supranational form of company to the national types of com-
panies which will continue in their present form.
National company law may also be altered on the initiative of the
Commission in Brussels. This is done by means of directives in-
structing the Member States to bring their national company law
into accordance with the directives' provisions. This harmonization
of national company laws is quite distinct from the Commission's
project of a Statute for the European Company. This Statute serves
another purpose.
When the regulation providing for this Statute has been approved
by the Council of Ministers, it will offer a new instrument for eco-
nomic cooperation across the borders. This instrument will serve the
aims of the European Communities by fostering economic integra-
tion between the Member States. At the same time the Statute
for the S.E. offers a complete model for a transnational corporation,
including regulation of employees' participation on an international
level. In our days, where much discussion is going on about multi-
nationals, the Statute, although conceived on a regional basis, may
also for this reason deserve attention from outside the European
Communities.
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